Eighteen years after publication of James Fearon's article stressing the importance of domestic audience costs in international crisis bargaining, we continue to look for clear evidence to support or falsify his argument.
that democracies are more likely to exhibit certain advantages during crises, we generally cannot infer causality from this relationship, largely because states realize different types of regimes through decidedly nonrandom processes. Whatever causes democracy may itself be partly or wholly responsible for various desirable democratic attributes. Second, the data sets generally used to test audience cost theory may not be well suited to the task because they include many cases in which leaders make no threats. 12 Trachtenberg and Snyder and Borghard use forms of process tracing, in each case finding little evidence of the audience costs mechanism at work. Although advocates of these methods argue with some justification that process tracing is better suited for testing causal mechanisms, neither study makes a convincing effort to explain why the approach is appropriate in the context of audience costs. 22 We acknowledge that carefully crafted case studies can help identify causal mechanisms in many instances, but we are skeptical about the extent to which process tracing can be used to uncover the audience costs mechanism.
18 Consider the "gold standard" for quantitative causal inference: the randomized drug trial. Such a research design is well suited to determining whether treatment with a particular drug causes a change in patients' symptoms. It cannot determine, however, how the drug caused that effect. 19 For a similar argument, see Snyder and Borghard, " than how X affects Y. Both papers aim to identify the cases in which one is most likely to observe leaders creating audience costs in order to send credible signals to other leaders. The logic of inference here is that a lack of support for the theory, even in those cases in which it is most likely to operate, provides strong evidence against the theory.
Both projects thus fail to test directly the key implication of Fearon's theory. The dependent variable in each case is the extent to which audience costs matter in crises, and the implicit hypothesis is that the costs should play critical roles in crises that meet certain scope conditions. Both articles present evidence against this hypothesis. To the extent that we might accept the evidence on its own terms, following the logic of a most likely design we could infer 25 Although Gerring argues convincingly that case studies can be useful when we are more interested in learning about a causal mechanism than a causal effect, he does not offer solutions to the issues specific to testing audience cost theory that we have raised. focusing instead on whether audience costs are more likely to be used in certain types of crises.
Second, Fearon argues that the creation of audience costs is a mechanism that allows leaders to send more credible signals during a crisis. Neither Trachtenberg nor Snyder and Borghard provide evidence that would lead us to believe leaders cannot use audience costs in this way.
<A>THE MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF AUDIENCE COSTS</A>
Causal mechanisms are difficult to test. This seems to be especially true with audience costs, in part because actors have strategic incentives to hide or misinterpret their intentions. Although the analysis of crisis behavior -through case studies or statistical analysis-can be used to shed light on the debate, finding conclusive evidence for or against audience cost theory may prove elusive. As with other formal models, the theory could be tested by careful specification of comparative statics combined with empirical work. We also encourage scholars to focus on testing the theory where it is arguably weakest: in its micro-foundations. Within the limited space here, we identify a foundation that deserves particular attention: the availability of information to the domestic public.
The theory assumes the public has sufficient information regarding crisis behavior, including, crucially, information that can be manipulated by leaders seeking to create audience costs. This is a very strong assumption and one that is empirically uncertain. Indeed, if we are to observe the audience costs mechanism in action, we are most likely to do so through the process of leaders communicating with their publics. The key issue here can be summed up in the following question: Do publics have sufficient information regarding crisis behavior, even when leaders seek to signal to other states by creating audience costs?
There are several reasons to think domestic audiences may not be as well informed as the theory requires. First, the public is not generally knowledgeable about politics, especially about foreign policy. 27 The public may overcome this problem by using "information shortcuts," but how or whether leaders can create audience costs in light of these shortcuts is not clear. 28 Second, understandings of political communication have been questioned by recent advances in cognitive science. It may no longer be safe to pretend publics can process signals in the ways assumed by audience cost theory. Finally, if we assume the media are effective and unbiased conduits of information, then we might readily observe audience costs in the making in media content. Such an assumption is theoretically and empirically tenuous, however, given that the role of the media in this process is unclear. 29 If the media fail to convey information to publics, then the ability of leaders to use the audience costs mechanism will be limited. 30 Just as importantly, if the media are ineffective in the role of mobilizing public attention to leader commitments, then looking for audience costs by analyzing media reports will lead to biased conclusions about whether leaders actually use audience costs.
